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RECENT DECISIONS

AGENCY-BORROWED

SERVANT DOCTRINE-SURGEON'S

LIABILITY

FOR NEGLIGENCE OF HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES.

Yorston v. Pennell (Pa. 1959).
After receiving an injury the plaintiff was admitted to the receiving
ward of a hospital where a resident physician examined him, ordered
X-rays, and directed a junior intern to take his medical history. The junior
intern was a hospital employee, qualified to take medical histories, though
not required to do so while on duty in the receiving ward. Although the
resident physician was paid and assigned to service by the hospital, he
was not a licensed surgeon, but a student of general surgery who could
perform an operation only with the permission of a staff surgeon.' When
he received the X-rays that he had ordered, he took them to the defendant, a staff surgeon, who, after discussing the planned treatment, gave
the resident physician the necessary consent to operate. The junior intern, meanwhile, failed to record that the plaintiff was allergic to penicillin, although the allergy was clearly made known to the intern. The
operation was successful, but the resident physician, in dictating postoperative orders, prescribed penicillin, from which plaintiff suffered severe
injuries. The trial court submitted the case to the jury on the ground
of respondeat superior and there was a judgment for the plaintiff. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, two justices dissenting, holding
that it could be inferred from the evidence in the record that the resident
physician was the agent, and the junior intern the sub-agent, of the
defendant, so that the defendant was liable for the negligence of the
intern in taking the plaintiff's medical history. Yorston v. Pennell, 397 Pa.
28, 153 A.2d 255 (1959).2
1. For such an operation, a resident physician was not permitted to make any
charge, but his compensation consisted chiefly of the advancement of his education
through the experience of minor surgical operations and through the instructions
and advice given him by the staff surgeons. The surgeons in turn were allowed
to receive compensation from the patient for the services rendered by the residents.
In the principal case, the defendant, after signing the plaintiff's admission sheets and
progress charts as chief or attending physician, exercised his prerogative to receive
compensation for the resident's services by billing the plaintiff's insurer.
2. Yorston v. Pennell, 397 Pa. 28, 153 A.2d 255 (1959).

(290)
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Under the doctrine of respondeat superior it is well-settled law that
the master is liable for the torts of his servant, committed in the course
of employment.' However, where the servant is in the employ of two
different persons at the same time,4 most courts will hold only one employer liable, the test being whether as to the specific transaction in question, the servant is acting in the business and under the direction of the
general employer or the special employer.5 When different inferences
can fairly be drawn from the evidence as to who is the controlling master
of the borrowed employee at the time of the commission of the negligent
6
act, it is for the jury, not the court, to determine the question of agency.
A majority of cases hold that nurses or interns, while assisting at an
operation, are the servants of the operating surgeon, even though they
are hospital employees. 7 But with regard to pre-operative and postoperative care, hospital employees are ordinarily not the servants of the
surgeon while in the performance of their professional duties., Thus,
the negligence of a nurse in preparing a tray to be used at an operation
was not imputed to the operating surgeon who had ordered her to do so,
since the nurse in preparing the tray's contents for the operation was not
the servant, employee, or agent of the doctor.9 Similarly, a physician who
performed an operation on a patient was not liable for injuries suffered
when a hospital intern, pursuant to instructions from the physician but
not in his presence, was negligent in removing stitches. 10 Where hospital
employees are negligent in administering services of a type normally performed by hospitals through their employees, courts have held that the
employees remain in the employ of the hospitals, even though the serv3. Joseph v. United Workers Ass'n, 343 Pa. 636, 23 A.2d 470 (1942).
4. Gordon v. Buyers, 309 Pa. 453, 164 Ati. 334 (1932); Laughner v. Pointer,

5 B. & C. 547 (K.B. 1826). In this famous early English case, where a servant was
drawing a horse and carriage for a country gentleman who hired the driver and
horses from a stablekeeper, the judges of the court of King's Bench divided as to
whether the country gentleman or the stablekeeper was the master. This conflict
of opinion was indicative of the difficulty courts would experience in the future in
deciding who is the servant's master.
5. Moseman v. L. M. Penwell Undertaking Co., 151 Kan. 610, 100 P.2d 669
(1940). Contra, Gordon v. Buyers, 309 Pa. 453, 164 Atl. 334 (1932) (imposition
of liability on both employers).
6. See Jackson v. Joyner, 236 N.C. 259, 72 S.E.2d 589 (1952); McCowen v.
Sisters of Most Precious Blood of Enid, 208 Okla. 130, 253 P.2d 830 (1953) ; Benedict v. Bondi, 384 Pa. 574, 122 A.2d 209 (1956); McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa.
355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949).
7. Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal.2d 82, 64 P.2d 409 (1936); St. Paul-Mercury Indem.
Co. v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 212 Minn. 558, 4 N.W.2d 637 (1942); Jackson v.
Joyner, 236 N.C. 259, 72 S.E.2d 589 (1952); Aderhold v. Bishop, 94 Okla. 206, 221
Pac. 752 (1923) ; McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A. 2d 243 (1949) ; Minogue
v. Rutland Hosp., 119 Vt. 336, 125 A.2d 796 (1956).
8. Sherman v. Hartman, 137 Cal. App. 2d 589, 290 P.2d 894 (1955); Benedict
v. Bondi, 384 Pa. 574, 122 A.2d 209 (1956); Stewart v. Mannasses, 244 Pa. 221,
90 At. 574 (1914).
9. Hallinan v. Prindle, 17 Cal. App. 2d 656, 62 P. 2d 1075 (1936).
10. Shull v. Schwartz, 364 Pa. 554, 73 A.2d 402 (1950).
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ices are ordered by the surgeons." In the principal case, the court reasoned that the intern was the sub-agent of the defendant because he had
not been required to take medical histories while on duty in the receiving ward, and therefore, would not have taken the plaintiff's medical
history if the resident physician had not selected him to do so. 12 In this
sense, the resident physician, who had become the agent of the defendant
when the defendant authorized him to perform the operation, "borrowed"
13
the intern from the hospital.
The negligence in the principal case consisted of the failure of the
intern to record properly the plaintiff's medical history, a pre-operative
function.' 4 In holding the defendant liable for such negligence, the court
has ignored the principle it expressed in Benedict v. Bondi,15 that control by the surgeon does not exist in regard to either pre-operative or
post-operative care which is not administered in the operating room in
the presence of the surgeon and under his direct charge. The court also
ignored the second standard test of a surgeon's liability for a hospital
employee's negligence, i.e., whether the services were of a type normally
performed by a hospital through its employees.' 6 Instead, it adopted as
the basis of decision the fact that the service which the defendant's agent
directed was not one which the intern was required to perform at that
particular time. This decision increases the bounds of a surgeon's liability,
which, by the test set forth in Hohenthal v. Smith,17 had not previously
extended to services of a type normally performed by a hospital through
its employees. The unfortunate result of this decision will be to divert
the surgeon's attention to routine matters, such as the taking of medical
histories, thus, depriving the patient and the hospital of the full benefit
of his talents. It is submitted that a surgeon's liability for the negligence
of hospital employees should be limited to care administered in the operating room, and even in the operating room, the surgeon should not be
liable when the service involved is of a type normally performed by a
hospital through its employees.' 8
L. Francis Murphy
11. Hohenthal v. Smith, 114 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Seneris v. Haas, 45
Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955); Salgo v. Sanford, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317
P.2d 170 (1957); Hallinan v. Prindle, 17 Cal. App. 2d 656, 62 P.2d 1075 (1936);
Meadows v. Patterson, 21 Tenn. App. 283, 109 S.W.2d 417 (1937).
12. Yorston v. Pennell, 397 Pa. 28, 40, 153 A.2d 255, 260 (1959).
13. Ibid.
14. Id. at 57, 153 A.2d at 268 (dissenting opinion).
15. 384 Pa. 574, 580, 122 A.2d 209, 211 (1956).
16. Hohenthal v. Smith, 114 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Meadows v. Patterson,
21 Tenn. App. 283, 109 S.W.2d 417 (1937).
17. Hohenthal v. Smith, supra note 16.
18. Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955); Salgo v. Stanford,
154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
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AGENCY-RATIFICATION-EFFECT
LIMITATIONS ON

OF STATUTE OF

SUBSEQUENT AFFIRMANCE.

Trenton v. Fowler-Thorne Co. (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1959).
The City of Trenton b~ought an action against Fowler-Thorne Company and Seaboard Surety Company on June 27, 1957, claiming breach
of a contract for the erection of an addition to a municipal hospital building and alleging defects which had become apparent some time after
August 2, 1951, the date on which the building had been accepted and
final payment made by the city. The defendants, the contractor and the
surety on the public construction performance bond, respectively, answered
jointly on August 14, 1957, denying liability and raising the defense that
the suit was improperly instituted by a single City Commissioner instead
of, as required, by the Board of Commissioners. On May 15, 1958, the
Board of Commissioners adopted a resolution authorizing, ratifying and
confirming the bringing of the action by the Commissioner. When the
suit was called for trial, defendants were permitted to amend their answer
to include the defense of the statute of limitations. The court ordered
this issue settled on motion before trial. The city argued that the bond
was under seal and therefore subject to a sixteen year limitation and,
that the six year limitation period governing contract actions did not
apply in this case, at any rate, since the action was properly brought by
an authorized commissioner within the statutory period or, alternatively,
that any lack of authority on the part of the commissioner was cured by
subsequent ratification. The trial court held that the commissioner lacked
authority to bring the action, that the ratification by the Board could not

relate back to the date on which the action was instituted since, if the
six year limitation period applied, the defense of limitations had inter-

vened, but that in any case the six year period did not apply because
the action was on a sealed instrument covered by the sixteen year period.
The trial court permitted both a direct appeal by defendants and a crossappeal by plaintiff thereby putting all issues before the Superior Court,
Appellate Division. That court, considering only the issues presented by
the City's cross-appeal, affirmed, holding that although the commissioner
did not have authority to institute the action, the fact that the statutory
period of limitations had passed before ratification did not vest defendants
with the defense of limitations but that the ratification was effective and
the action could be continued. Trenton v. Fowler-Thorne Co., 154 A.2d
369 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1959). 1
"Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori aequiparatur""Every ratification is dragged back and treated as equivalent to a prior
1. Trenton v. Fowler-Thorne Co., 154 A.2d 369 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1959).
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authority"-is a maxim of the law of agency.2 Generally, litigation concerning the effect of ratification finds the purported principal trying to
avoid liability to the third party by denying that he has ratified the unauthorized act of an agent. There are relatively few cases in which the
principal, attempting to bind the third party to an unauthorized agreement with the agent, claims to have ratified. However, it appears to be
settled law that the principal may affirm or adopt the unauthorized act
of his agent and that his ratification is effective and relates back to the
time of the act if it occurs before the third party has communicated an
intention to withdraw from the agreement either to the purported principal
or to the agent. 8 The English rule is somewhat more strict 4 and there
appears to be some authority, at the other extreme, holding that an attempted ratification is effective only if accepted by the third party., Under
the prevailing view no limitation is placed on the principal's power to
ratify other than the fact that he must do so before the third party
withdraws. The ratification must occur before there is such a material
change in circumstances that it would be inequitable to hold the third
party liable unless he agrees to be bound.6 The issue presented in the
instant case falls within this rule, that is, whether the running of the
statute of limitations between the time of the unauthorized act of the
agent in instituting the action and the affirmance by the principal creates
such a material change in circumstances as to make it inequitable to permit ratification.7 There is no doubt that a principal may subsequently
ratify the unauthorized bringing of an action by an agent. 8 He may ratify,
and the ratification will relate back to the bringing of the action, even after
the agent's lack of authority has been challenged by the other party. 9 But
it appears that there are no cases, other than the instant one, in which
the statute of limitations has run between the unauthorized bringing of
2. Fleckner v. Bank of United States, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 338 (1823) ;

MECHEM,

OUTLINES Or THE LAW Ov AGENCY 127 (4th ed. 1952).

3. Equity Mutual Ins. Co. v. General Cas. Co., 139 F.2d 723 (10th Cir. 1943);
Steinfeld & Co. v. Broxholme, 59 Cal. App. 623, 211 Pac. 473 (1922) ; McClintock v.
South Penn Oil Co., 146 Pa. St. 144, 23 At. 211 (1892) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
AGENCY § 88 (1958).
4. Ratification is effective if it occurs within a reasonable time regardless of
any attempt to withdraw on the part of the third party when he learns of the agent's
lack of authority. Bolton Partners v. Lambert, 41 Ch. Div. 295 (1889).
5. This is the Wisconsin rule as expressed in Dodge v. Hopkins, 15 Wis. 630
(1861). There are no recent decisions but the rule was followed at least once in
Atlee v. Bartholomew, 69 Wis. 43, 33 N.W. 110 (1887). This appears to be the law
in Wisconsin. See, 1947 Wis. L. REv. 394.
6. Cook v. Tullis, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 332 (1874); People ex rel. Goldschmidt
v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 217 N.Y. 470, 112 N.E. 167 (1916). See
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 89 (1958).
7. Trenton v. Fowler-Thorne Co., 154 A.2d 369 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1959).
8. Bowles v. Wheeler, 152 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1945) ; Sayre v. City of Orange,
67 At. 933 (N.J. 1907) ; Moe v. Zitek, 75 N.D. 222, 27 N.W.2d 10 (1947).
9. Couch v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 297 Fed. 216 (5th Cir. 1924) ; Massachusetts Constr. Co. v. Kidd, 142 Fed. 285 (1st Cir. 1905).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1960

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1960], Art. 10
WINTER

1959-60]

RECENT DECISIONS

the action and the affirmance thereof. The Restatement of Agency is the
only authority supporting the proposition that if the statute of limitations
runs before affirmance ratification is not effective.10
The New Jersey court held that the running of the statute of limitations between the date of the unauthorized commencement of the suit
and the date of its ratification did not vest the defendants with such a
right to immunity from suit that it would result in prejudice or injustice
to permit ratification. This is in line with decisions which are somewhat
analogous. Those jurisdictions in which procedure permits amendment
of complaints or correction of improper parties permit such correction
even after the statute of limitations has run; provided the suit was timely
brought in the first instance, the cause of action remains the same, and
the correction can be made without dismissing the suit or subjecting
defendants to greater liability." If the defendant is not prejudiced and
injustice will not result, defects may be corrected and the statute of limitations will not bar continuation of the suit. The Restatement appears to
subscribe to this view. 12 Therefore, when the ratification of the unauthorized commencement of a suit does nothing more than cure a technical
error in the bringing of the suit, there would appear to be no reason not
to permit it even though the period of limitation has expired in the
interim. In the instant case, action was brought in the name of the City
of Trenton. The defendants had notice thereof and of the grounds of
the complaint. Their answer indicates that they were prepared to defend
on the merits since they denied liability for the condition of the building.' 3
Permitting the ratification to relate back in such a case could not create
any substantial prejudice to a defense on the merits. The court clearly
does not intend that the running of the statutory period should never
bar a subsequent ratification of an unauthorized bringing of an action.' 4
But, at least, under such facts as in the instant case, it is reasonable to
find that the running of the statute of limitations did not create a right
in the defendants with which it would be inequitable to interfere.
Catherine McEntee
10. RESTATEMENT (SScoND), AGENCY § 84, comment b at 214 (1958). The Restatement cites no cases in support of the statement, and cases cited in the Reporter's
Notes to § 90 Appendix 158, do not involve the statute of limitations.
11. Bowles v. Wheeler, 152 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1945); Green v. Walsh, 21
F.R.D. 15 (E.D. Wis. 1958). And see cases cited N.J.S. 2A:14-1, N.J.S.A. and
28 U.S.C.A. Rule 15 (c).
12. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),

AGENCY, Reporter's Notes to § 90. Appendix at

156-57.
13. Trenton v. Fowler-Thorne Co., 154 A.2d 369, 370 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
1959).

14. Id. at 375-76.
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1952-INTERPRE-

TATION OF THE PHRASE "COUNTRY WHENCE THEY CAME."

United States ex rel. Tom We Shung v. Murff (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
The relator, Tom We Shung, a native of China, arrived in San
Francisco in November, 1947,' seeking admission as the minor son of a
United States citizen. 2 When relator was found inadmissible by a board
of Special Inquiry in January, 1948, an appeal was taken through the
Immigration and Naturalization Service,8 followed by protracted litigation
in the United States courts 4 for a period of eleven years without success.
During these years of judicial and administrative proceedings, relator
had been at liberty in the United States on bond,5 until September, 1958,
when he was summarily taken into custody for deportation to Communist
China. Thereupon, the present habeas corpus proceeding was instituted.
The district court held that relator was deportable to Communist China,
since it was "the country whence he came," and that he was an excludee,
and therefore not a subject for the relief from the physical persecution
clause 6 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. United States
ex rel. Tom We Shung v. Murff, 176 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).T
A distinction has long been made between the exclusion of an alien 8
and the expulsion of an alien.9 The Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 uses the phrase "country whence they came" to describe the destination of excluded aliens, but it does not use the phrase in the section pertaining to the expulsion of aliens.' 0 The phrase was originally inserted
in the law to protect the alien, as it was directed to the ship owner tak1. At this time the mainland of China was under the control of Chaing Kai-Shek.
2. Under the provisions of the War Brides Act of December 28, 1945, 59 STAT.
659, 8 U.S.C. § 232 (1946).
3. Shung has sought reversal of this finding in four separate proceedings before
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
4. Shung has instituted declaratory judgment actions in the federal courts
none of which resulted in a final judgment on the merits. Tom We Shung v. McGrath, 103 F. Supp. 507 (D.D.C. 1952); Tom We Shung v. Brownell, 207 F.2d 40
(D.C. Cir. 1953); Tom We Shung v. Brownell, 346 U.S. 180 (1956); and Tom We
Shung v. Brownell, 227 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Brownell v. Tom We Shung,
352 U.S. 180 (1956).
5. He was paroled in accordance with the then existing administrative procedure
now sanctioned by statute. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 212 (d)(5),
66 STAT. 188, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (d)(5).
6. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 243 (h), 66 STAT. 212 (h), 8
U.S.C. § 1182 (h).
7. United States ex rel Tom We Shung v. Murff, 176 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
8. Exclusion proceedings involve aliens who have never officially been within
the United States.
9. Expulsion proceedings involve aliens who have either officially entered the
United States legally, or else entered the country illegally.
10. In the Immigration Act of 1917, however, the phrase was used to protect
both types of aliens.
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ing the alien out of this country, and it made it illegal for him to drop
the alien at the nearest available port." Although there are few decided
cases interpreting this phrase of the statute, the hazardous conditions
on the mainland of China were a matter of judicial notice in Delong v.
Shaughnessy,12 an expulsion case originating in the same district as the
instant case. Further, the Immigration and Naturalization Service itself
has stated, in a policy announcement made October 31, 1956,1 3 that Communist China is inhospitable to refugees. Nevertheless, the court in the
instant case refused to grant relator's plea for asylum because of possible
physical persecution upon his return to Communist China, and held that
it was bound by Congress' apparent intent to limit relief in such cases
14
to expellees.
The court in the instant case cited United States ex rel. Leong Choy
Moon v. Shaughnessy"5 for a definition of "country whence they came,"
but it failed to note the fact that in the aforementioned case, judicial
notice was taken of the conditions existing on the mainland of China,
and although an indefinite stay of deportation was denied the relator, the
court did grant a ninety day stay in order to give him the opportunity
to cooperate with the immigration authorities in arranging for his deportation to Formosa rather than to the Communist mainland. The court
disregards the fact that the government to which relator had owed his
allegiance prior to coming to this country is still in existence on a small
portion of the same geographical country from whence he came, namely,
the Republic of China on Formosa. In a similar situation during World
War II, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals authorized the deportation
of a Greek alien to the Greek government in exile in England, rather than
to his homeland then occupied by Nazi Germany. 18 Another solution to
this problem can be found in United States ex rel. Milanovic v. Murff,17
where the court expressed its opinion that the intent of Congress in
drafting the Immigration Act was to restore the alien to a status equivalent with his situation before his arrival in this country. That court then
declared Milanovic stateless, and granted the writ of habeas corpus. Whatever solution may finally be utilized, courts should keep in mind in cases
such as this, the principle expressed by Judge Frank of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy,'8
that stare decisis should not govern in a case where a man's life is at
11.
12.
13.
Barber,

Ng Lin Chong v. McGrath, 202 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953).
From the dissenting opinion in the five to four decision in Leng May Ma v.
357 U.S. 185, 191 (1958).

14. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h),
governing the exclusion of aliens, provides for a stay of deportation to any country
in which the alien would be in danger of physical persecution. There is no similar
provision in § 243(a) which deals with the expulsion of aliens.

15. 218 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1954).
16. Delany v. Moraitis, 136 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1943).

17. 253 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1958).
18. 234 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1955).
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stake. In the Foo case, Judge Frank granted a stay of deportation to the
relator and not only did he take judicial notice of the "ruthless behavior
of the Communist governments in China," 1 9 but he cast some doubt on
the Moon case, and even went so far as to talk in terms of the possible
unconstitutionality of the Immigration and Nationality Act, if it were to
be interpreted in a manner which would permit the immigration authorities to deprive a human being of his life, liberty or property without due
process of law. Perhaps the court in the instant case should have given
more consideration to the possible fate awaiting relator in Communist
China, rather than strictly applying a statutory provision which never
contemplated a situation such as exists here.
Joseph A. Walheim

BANKRUPTCY-FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-TIME OF TRANSFER
UNDER SECTION

67d(5)

OF THE BANKRUPTCY

ACT.

Kindom Uranium Corp. v. Vance (10th Cir. 1959).
Appellee, trustee in bankruptcy, received judgment in an action
brought in the district court of New Mexico to set aside as fraudulent
under section 67d(2) of the Bankruptcy Act,' a conveyance of the bankrupt's residence to appellant corporation. The transferor, who at the time
was an officer and director of the corporation, executed a quitclaim
deed to the property on April 10, 1956, and delivered it to the appellant
a few days later. However, the deed was not recorded 2 at this time. In
consideration for the transfer, the company agreed to cancel an antecedent
debt in the amount of 1000 dollars owing to it from the transferor, and
to issue her 4000 shares of company stock which had a par value of fifty

cents per share. Subsequently, the transferor was involved in an automobile accident, and litigation ensued. During the course of this litigation,
on January 23, 1957, appellant corporation recorded the deed as pro19. Id. at 718.
1. 52

STAT.

875 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 107d(2)

(1952).

"Every transfer made

and every obligation incurred by a debtor within one year prior to the filing of a

petition initiating a proceeding under this title by or against him is fraudulent . . .
(c) as to those existing and future creditors, if made or incurred without fair consideration by a debtor who intends to incur or believes that he will incur debts
beyond his ability to pay as they mature; or (d) as to then existing and future
creditors, if made or incurred with actual intent as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay or defraud either existing or future creditors."
2. N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 13, § 13-203 (1941). "No deed, mortgage or other instrument in writing, not recorded in accordance with § 13-201, shall affect the title
or right to, in any real estate, of any purchaser, mortgagor in good faith or judgment creditor, without knowledge of the existence of such unrecorded instruments."

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1960

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1960], Art. 10
WINTER

1959-60]

RECENT DECISIONS

vided by statute.3 Thereafter, a judgment was entered against the transferor which exceeded her insurance coverage by 5000 dollars, and on
January 3, 1958, she filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
and held that there was sufficient evidence to show an absence of fair
consideration for the transfer, and that the bankrupt believed she would
incur debts beyond her ability to pay, thus making the conveyance fraudulent under section 67d(2) (c) of the Bankruptcy Act. Kindom Uranium
4
Corp. v. Vance, 269 F.2d 104 (10th Cir. 1959).
Since early Elizabethan times, conveyances of real property, upon
certain prescribed conditions," have been held to be invalid as fraudulent
to creditors. The concept has been adhered to in the United States, and
moreover, has been extended to cover all conveyances wronging creditors
even when the actual intent to defraud does not exist. 6 Congress, in the
National Bankruptcy Act of 1898,7 which was strengthened by amendment in 1926,8 provided machinery for discovering fraudulent transfers
and punishing the guilty parties. Finally, the Chandler Act of 1938, 9
by interweaving into the federal law the substance of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 10 set out clearly the rules regarding transfers which
may be avoided by a trustee as a fraud of creditors. In section 67d(2) (c)
of the Bankruptcy Act, it is provided that transfers within a year of
filing are fraudulent if incurred without fair consideration and with an
intent or a belief by the debtor that the subsequent creditors will be injured. 1 Just what is fair consideration has been stated in section 67d (1) (e)
of the act,' 2 which says the consideration must be "in good faith," "fair
equivalent," and "not disproportionately small." Moreover, the cases hold
that fairness is a question of fact which depends on the circumstances
when read in light of the statutory definition.' The iourt in the instant
case held that the facts as put forth, especially the confusing evidence
concerning the antecedent debt and the absence of proof of any value of
3. N.M. STAT.

ANN. ch. 13, § 13-201 (1941).
4. Kindom Uranium Corp. v. Vance, 269 F. 2d 104 (10th Cir. 1959).
5. Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances, 1570, 13 Eliz., ch. 5. ". . . feoffments,
gifts, grants, alienations, (etc.) . . . devised and contrived of malice, fraud . . .
with intent . . . to delay, hinder or defraud creditors of their just and lawful

actions ....
"
6. See Commissioners' Prefatory Note to Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,

9 U.L.A. 43.

7. 30 Stat. 544.
8. 44 Stat. 662.
9. 52 STAT. 875 (1938),

Act.

11 U.S.C. § 107. Chandler Act amended the Bankruptcy

10. 9A U.L.A. 42.
11. Supra note 1.

12.

52

STAT.

877 (1938),

11 U.S.C. § 107d(1) (e).

13. Roth v. Fabrikant Bros., Inc., 175 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1949); Matter of
Peoria Braumeister Co., 138 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1943); Pennsylvania Trust v.
Schenecker, 289 Pa. 277, 137 At. 272 (1927). (The Pennsylvania Trust case was
decided under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act which defines fair consideration in substantially the same words as used by the Bankruptcy Act).
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the stock involved, could well have led to the conclusion that the consideration was not fair under the Bankruptcy Act. 14 The time when the
transfer is deemed made is controlled by section 67d(5)1 5 which states
that transfer is made at the time "when it became so far perfected that
no bona fide purchaser from the debtor could have acquired any rights in
the property." Although the original execution and delivery of the deed
was accomplished almost two years before the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy, the court asserts that the transfer was not perfected under
67d(5) until recorded, about eleven months before bankruptcy. Thus,
the transfer is held open to attack by the trustee and is fraudulent.
The instant case is interesting due to its handling of section 67d(5),
and the use of the "perfected as to bona fide purchaser" test to hold open
to attack by the trustee, a conveyance which on its face appears to have
been made almost two years before bankruptcy. There are very few cases
which have involved this section. In a Texas case, Segrest v. Hale,16
where a judgment debtor filed a petition in bankruptcy, it was found
that although the debtor had previously conveyed the land to his sister
by deed of gift, the deed was not recorded until after the filing, and
thus the trustee became vested with an interest in the realty with the power
to sell it to the judgment creditors. While the court in that case' 7 discusses the applicability of 67d(5) to 67d(2), it concerned itself with
transfers perfected after filing, and did not handle the problem as it arose
in the instant case, where the conveyance is made more than a year prior
to filing and the deed is recorded within that required year. It has been
said that the manifest purpose of section 67d(5) is to prevent fraudulent
transfers from becoming impregnable to attack by virtue of their being
kept secret until the limitation period has passed.18 It seems that the
present case bears out the statement, for it places in the hands of the
trustee a weapon whereby he may strike down not only transfers executed
in the dim past and not recorded, but also conveyances fraudulent in fact
which are predated to escape the one-year provision. It would appear
that the instant case could have been decided no other way, and that it
falls neatly into the pattern of this section of the Bankruptcy Act which
purports to have strengthened the law against these unlawful and fraudulent practices. 19
Thomas J. Ward
14. Kindom Uranium Corp. v. Vance, 269 F.2d 104, 108 (10th Cir. 1959).
15. 52 Stat. 878 (1938). (Amended by 66 Stat. 429 (1952)).
16. 164 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
17. Id. at 795.
18. 4 COLMIR, BANKRUPvCY 407 (1942).
19. Wolfe, Detection of Fraud Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 13 TsMP. L.Q.
1 (1938).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BURDENS ON INTERSTATE COMMERCEREFUSAL OF A RESTAURANT To SERVE A NEGRO MOVING
IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant (4th Cir. 1959).
Plaintiff, while traveling interstate on business, was refused service
in defendant restraurant solely because he was a Negro. Plaintiff brought
an action on behalf of himself and all others of his class similarly situated,' seeking money damages and an injunction on the grounds that
defendant's action discriminated against a person moving in interstate
commerce, interfered with the free flow of commerce in violation of the
Constitution of the United States and also violated the Civil Rights Act
of 1875.2 The district court dismissed the suit and on an appeal the court
of appeals affirmed holding, that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in so far
3
as it applies to private citizens of a state has been held unconstitutional,
that the mere grant by a state of a license to operate a restaurant does
not constitute sufficient state action so as to enable plaintiff to invoke
4
the privilege and immunities clauses of the United States Constitution,
and furthermore, since defendant is not engaged in interstate commerce,
1. It would seem that plaintiff attempted to bring a spurious type class action

under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 STAT. 446 (1959), 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1959). A spurious type class action is one in which numerous persons
are interested in a common question of law or fact. However, the presence of a
class is still necessary and it is dubious whether there is any damaged class in
existence.
2. The pertinent sections of the act are: "Sec. 2 (1). That all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public

conveyances on land or water, theater, and other places of amusement; ....

"Sec. 2 (2). That any person who shall violate the foregoing section . . . shall,
for every such offense, forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars to the person
agrieved thereby .
"
1 Supp. to Rev. Stat. 67. Compare the wording to that

of the present Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1957).

3. In his brief plaintiff argued that the act was capable of three possible constructions. Under the first it had been held unconstitutional in the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), but under the second the act would be constitutional if
it is held to be authorized by the general scope of power granted in art. I, specifically, the commerce and "necessary and proper" clauses. Finally the act can be
construed as having been authorized by the fourteenth amendment to the extent
that it prohibits private acts of discrimination that are enforced, or enforceable, by,
state law, usage, custom or other state action. The plaintiff urged a re-examination
of the act in light of the two latter theories.
4. Plaintiff did not rely on a state action theory. Williams v. Howard Johnson's
Restaurant, 268 F.2d at 847. The court's discussion of state action is therefore
dictum and not within the scope of the present note. However, the line of
cases which have greatly expanded the concept or state action are capable of two
possible theoretical assumptions. 1) A private individual or group is subject to
constitutional limitations when it undertakes to perform a function regarded as the
exclusive function of the state. 2) When the state permits private individuals or
groups to violate rights guaranteed by the Congress against state infringement, the
state is held to approve the action and state action results. See Shanks, "State
Action" and the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. PA. L. Rev. 213 (1956). See also
Whiteside v. Southern Bus Lines, Inc., 177 F.2d 949 (4th Cir. 1949) where the
court held that there is no distinction in principle when an action is sanctioned or
required by state law.
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it is free to deal with such customers as it chooses. Williams v. Howard
Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959).'
Although the power of the federal government to regulate interstate
commerce cannot be doubted,6 there is much controversy as to just what
constitutes interstate commerce and the extent of the federal power to
regulate it.7 It was early decided that "commerce" is a general term,
not limited to mere buying and selling but including intercourse as well.,
However, federal power over interstate commerce was exercised mainly
over interstate transportation.9 Then in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Co., 10 the Court embarked on a more liberal interpretation of the
federal commerce power." However, in spite of the Court's past reluctance to expand the application of the federal commerce power, it
has not hesitated to expand its conception of the word transportation
in order to bring more aspects of transportation within the ambit of the
commerce power of the federal government. Accordingly, it has been
long held that mere transportation of a person across a state line is interstate commerce ;12 that this is true whether it is done for commercial
4
3
purposes or not,' and even if a private means of conveyance is used.'
In the instant case, although plaintiff was obviously engaged in interstate
commerce, the court declares that it was also necessary that defendant
be engaged in interstate commerce, implying that plaintiff could have re5
covered only if defendant was subject to the Interstate Commerce Act.1
There is little doubt that the Civil Rights Act of 1875, insofar as it
applied to private citizens of a state, has been held unconstitutional.'6
However, this raises new problems. First, one of the reasons plaintiff
brought his action under this act is that it obviates the necessity of a
minimum amount in controversy' 7 necessary to give the federal courts
5. Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959).
6. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
7. Williams, Does the Commerce Clause Give Power to Dominate All Industry?,
83 U. rA. L. Rzv. 23 (1934).
8. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
9. CORWIN, THP CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MZANs TODAY, 32 (10th ed. 1948).

10. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In this decision Chief Justice Hughes joined what had
previously been the minority, i.e., Justices Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo,
to constitute a new majority. Although this was not the first case outside of the
field of transportation, it was a landmark case.
11. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) ; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 307 U.S. 33 (1939); Santa Cruz Fruit Packing
Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453 (1938); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing
Co., 301 U.S. 581 (1937) ; NLRB v. Fruehauf, 301 U.S. 49 (1937).
12. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 164 (1941) ; United States v. Hill, 248 U.S.
420 (1918) ; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
13. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Sloan v. United States,
279 Fed. 563 (8th Cir. 1922); United States v. Burch, 226 Fed. 974 (D.C. Cal.
1915).
14. Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563 (1914) ; Hart v. United States, 11
Fed. 499 (9th Cir. 1926).
15. But see 72 STAT. 570 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1959).
16. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
17. Brief for Appellant, appendix-p. 4.
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jurisdiction.' 8 Since plaintiff could no longer bring his suit under this
act, he was subject to section 1331 of Title 28 U.S.C.,' 9 and since the
amount in controversy was obviously less than the statutory minimum,
neither the district court nor the court of appeals had jurisdiction. Second,
the only other grounds for recovery pleaded by plaintiff was a violation
of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.2 0 The question that here interposes itself is, whether, in the absence of federal and
state legislation, one private individual can maintain an action against
another private individual on the grounds that the latter is interfering
with interstate commerce and thereby damaging plaintiff. The commerce
clause does not give or guarantee any individual rights or privileges but
merely delineates the federal power over commerce. It does not of itself
give an individual a private cause of action. Thus, since the amount in
controversy is less than the statutory minimum and since plaintiff had
no standing to bring this action, the court lacked jurisdiction and it was
not necessary for the court to consider the merits of plaintiff's commerce
clause theory. However, the court did consider it and in fact based its
decision on it. Since, according to decisions of the Supreme Court,2 ' the
mere transportation of a person across a state line, even if for no commercial reason and in a private automobile constitutes interstate commerce, it is obvious that plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce. A
person so traveling needs nourishment and the refusal to serve him food
solely on the grounds that he is a Negro is plainly discriminatory and
would seem to place an undue burden on interstate commerce. 22 This
is so even though defendant is not subject to the Interstate Commerce
Act, 23 since a person not engaged in interstate commerce can obviously
be guilty of placing an undue burden on interstate commerce. It would
seem that plaintiff could have recovered had he brought his action under
18. 63 STAT. 446 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1949).
19. Section 1331 of Title 28 U.S.C. provides: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds
the sum or value of $3,000 [now $10,000], exclusive of interest and costs, and
arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."
20. Although plaintiff indirectly mentioned state action and the court dealt with
it, he did not allege it as a theory of recovery. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, provides,
inter alia, merely that "The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes ; .... "
21. See notes 12, 13, and 14, supra.
22. Although the burden on commerce would be clearer if plaintiff had been
an interstate carrier, it still exists here since plaintiff is engaged in interstate commerce. See Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946), where the court declared
that impairment of interstate commerce may arise from other causes than cost or
long delay and that burdens on commerce are those activities which directly impair
its usefulness. The line of Interstate Commerce Act cases seems to indicate a
federal policy of elimination of racial restriction on transportation in interstate commerce. See Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) ; Mitchell v. United
States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941)- Although the instant case does not come under this
act, the above cases would seem to indicate an attitude of the Court that any discrimination solely on the grounds of race is unreasonable and therefore places an
undue burden on interstate commerce.
23. See 72 STAT. 570 (195b), 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1959).
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the Civil Rights Act now in effect, 24 and this would have eliminated the

jurisdiction and standing to sue difficulties. 2r The necessary state action
will be found in the Code of Virginia2 6 which, under pain of criminal
prosecution and fine, requires the separation of the races in restaurants,
among other places. Therefore, in order to avoid criminal prosecution
under the statute, a restaurant must either have separate facilities or
serve only one race. Since defendant did not have separate facilities for
whites and Negroes, and was already serving white persons, he either
had to refuse plaintiff service or subject himself to possible criminal
prosecution. Thus, on the facts in this case, the Virginia statute, would
have the effect of commanding defendant to refuse to serve Negroes and
27
this is sufficient state action to obtain recovery.
Joseph G. Manta

CONSTITUTIONAL
-GENERAL

LAW-PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INcRIMINATION

IMMUNITY

STATUTE

HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL

AS APPLIED TO PROSPECTIVE DEFENDANTS BEFORE

A GRAND JURY.

People v. Steuding (N.Y. 1959)
The appellant was subpoenaed to testify before a state grand jury
investigating political corruption. After being advised that immunity was
not being conferred upon him and informed of his right under the federal
constitution and the constitution of the State of New York to refuse
to answer questions on the grounds that his answers might tend to incriminate him, appellant expressly declared that he understood his rights,
having been advised of them by counsel. Thereupon, he testified, filling
one-hundred and one pages with his testimony, before finally refusing to
testify any further. His refusal was based on article I, section 6 of the
constitution of the State of New York which provides that no person
"shall be compelled, in any criminal proceeding, to be a witness against
himself. . .

."

However, section 2447 of the Penal Code of New York

provides that no "person" may refuse to testify if granted immunity' and
that "immunity shall not be conferred . . . except in accordance with

this section."

2

The grand jury, having been instructed to disregard his

24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1957).
25. Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954), cert denied, 349 U.S. 940

(1955); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
26. Tit. 18, § 327 (1950).
27. See note 4 supra.
1. 39 N. Y. CONSOL.
2. 39 N. Y. CONsoL.

LAWS
LAWS

§ 2447(1) (McKinney, 1959).

§ 2447(4) (McKinney, 1959).
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testimony, indicted the appellant for conspiring to bribe public officials
and for giving such bribes, basing its action on the fact that appellant
had not been granted any immunity under section 2447. The Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, granted the motion to dismiss the indictment,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellant's privilege
against self-incrimination was violated by the subpoena, that the indictment must therefore be quashed, and that section 2447 of the Penal Code
was unconstitutional as applied to prospective defendants. People v. Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d 214, 160 N.E.2d 468, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1959). 3
The privilege against self-incrimination is a common law right4 which
has been incorporated into the federal constitution 5 and into most of the
state constitutions. 6 The privilege, as incorporated into the New York
constitution in 1821, T is framed in exactly the same words as those used
in the fifth amendment to the federal constitution. That a grand jury
proceeding is a "criminal prosecution" and therefore, one in which the
privilege against self-incrimination can be invoked is well established.8
It is also well established that the privilege of a defendant at trial is violated if he is called to the stand at all, or if an unfavorable inference is
drawn from his refusal to be sworn, 9 but an ordinary witness must invoke
the privilege in order to enjoy it. 10 The determination of whether the
privilege against self-incrimination has been violated at trial according
to the status of the person sworn is carried over, by analogy, to the
grand jury." However, in grand jury proceedings, a problem arises
concerning the status of a person who is marked for prosecution but has
2
not been formally accused when he was summoned before the grand jury.'
In New York, the distinction between an ordinary witness and one marked
3. People v. Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d 214, 160 N.E.2d 468, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1959).
4. 8 WIGMORS, EvrDmrCZ § 2250 (3d ed. 1940). See also Morgan, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. Rzv. 1 (1949) for a discussion of the
history of the privilege against self-incrimination.
5. U. S. CoNsT. amend. V.
6. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
7. N. Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
8. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1895); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547 (1891) ; People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665, 111 N.Y.S. 133 (1908) ; People
ex rel. Taylor v. Forbes, 143 N.Y. 219, 38 N.E. 303 (1894).
9. At common law, the accused could not testify even if he would. 8 WIGMORt,
EvIDXNC9 § 2272 (3d ed. 1940). It was necessary that an enabling statute be passed
in order that he might testify if he chose to do so. See 20 STAT. 30 (1878), 18
U.S.C. § 3481 (1952); 66 N. Y. CONsoL. LAWS § 393 (McKinney 1959).
10. O'Connell v. United States, 40 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1930); Re Knickerbocker
Steamboat Co., 139 Fed. 713 (C.C. 1905) ; People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192, 195
(N.Y. 1838); Southard v. Rerford, 6 Cow. 254, 259 (N.Y. 1826).
11. See United States v. Klien, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 924 (1958); United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 897 (1955); United States v. Hoffa, 156 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) for
recent federal cases questioning "status" as the basis for the operation of the
privilege.
12. This problem is particularly acute when the grand jury is one which is
investigating not the charges against an individual but a broad area or subject of
crime, as in the instant case.
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for prosecution was laid down in People v. Gillette;'3 and in People v.
Bermelx4 the court said that the privilege of a witness was violated when
he was subpoenaed if the grand jury investigation was only ostensibly
a general investigation but, in fact, was directed at the witness subsequently indicted. In 1955, the Court of Appeals held that an indictment would not stand against a prospective defendant called before a
general grand jury if the witness was not apprised of the fact that
he was a prospective defendant nor informed of the purpose of the
investigation nor of his right to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination, notwithstanding the fact that an exclusive immunity statute was in
effect. 5 An immunity statute is a method of terminating the operation
of the privilege against self-incrimination in a criminal proceeding by
compelling a witness to testify in exchange for immunity from prosecution. 16 If the witness is assured his testimony will not be used as the
basis of a prosecution against him, the reason for granting the privilege
against self-incrimination ceases to exist. 17 Section 2447 was the first
immunity statute in New York to confer immunity from prosecution commensurate with the right to invoke the privilege.' 8 Nevertheless, the
court in the instant case limited the applicability of section 2447 to witnesses by holding that if applied to a defendant, or one "in the shoes of
a defendant," it would violate the provision of the state constitution which
automatically confers the privilege against self-incrimination upon defendants. 19
The problem squarely presented by the instant case is whether a prospective defendant, who is called to testify before a grand jury and duly
informed of his privilege against self-incrimination and of the fact that
he is not being granted any immunity under statute and who thereafter
freely testifies, can be indicted for a crime concerning which he might have
incriminated himself in his testimony. The decision in the instant case
seems to be a logical progression of the historic position of the New York
courts that a prospective defendant enjoys the privilege against self-incrimination in the same posture as does one actually accused. The reason that
an actual defendant's privilege is deemed violated when he is subpoenaed
is that his answer to any question may tend to incriminate him.20 However, there is really no sound basis for the difference in the manner in
13. 126 App. Div. 665, 111 N.Y.S. 133 (1908).
14. 71 Misc. Rep. 356, 128 N.Y.S. 524 (1911).
15. People v. De Feo, 308 N.Y. 595, 127 N.E.2d 592 (1955).
16. REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION OF THE STATE or NEW YORK
FOR 1942, Leg. Doc. No. 65, Recommendation and Study Relating to Immunity from
Prosecution Secured in Exchange for Self-Incriminating Evidence in a Civil Action,
Proceeding or Investigation, § 7.
17. E.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); People ex rel. Lewishon v.
O'Brien, 176 N.Y. 253, 68 N.E. 353 (1903) ; People v. Sharp, 107 N.Y. 427, 14 N.E.

319 (1887). For a large collection of cases on this point see 8

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

§ 2281 (3d ed. 1940) at nn. 9-11.
18. 39 N. Y. CONSOL. LAWS § 2447 (McKinney, 1959).
19. People v. Steuding, 6 N.Y. 2d 214, 160 N.E.2d 468, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1959).

20. 8

WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE

§ 2282(2) (3d ed. 1940).
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which a witness' and a defendant's privilege comes into operation because,
in either case, it is not known beforehand whether he will exercise his
privilege. The reason for maintaining this difference, however, is the
fact that prior to the statutory provisions making a defendant a competent
witness, he was not allowed to take the stand at all, and, moreover, under
most competency statutes, the defendant can only be declared a competent
witness at his own request. 21 In order to be consistent the New York
courts would have to assign the same reasons for deeming the privilege
of a prospective defendant violated as they do for an actual defendant,
since both enjoy the privilege in the same way. But in the case where
the privilege is violated upon subpoena, the reason can not be the same
because a prospective defendant was a competent witness before the
passage of the competency statutes 22 whereas an actual defendant was
not; and the fact that he was not is the reason that his privilege is deemed
violated when he is subpoenaed before a grand jury. Consequently, it
seems that the "status" test, at least as applied to prospective defendants,
is based upon a rather shaky foundation. Moreover, although the "status"
test gives full recognition to that part of the privilege which protects a
person from testifying against himself, it does not adequately comprehend
the requisite that the testimony of the witness must be compelled before
his privilege is violated. 23 If the privilege of an ordinary witness is not
24
violated merely because he is subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury,
neither should the testimony of a defendant or a prospective defendant be
deemed compelled when he is subpoenaed. 25 A sounder basis than the
"status" test, namely the volition test, has been employed by the federal
courts and the majority of the state courts to determine whether or not
the privilege of a witness, other than the defendant, has been violated.
Under this test, a prospective defendant must invoke his privilege like
an ordinary witness, 26 and thus his privilege is not violated when he is
21. Ibid. The only other possible reason that a defendant's privilege is deemed
violated when he is sworn is that the jury might draw an unfavorable inference
from his invocation of the privilege and swearing him in would force him to invoke
the privilege if he wished to do so. However, it is now well established in the
federal courts and in most of the states that a jury will not be permitted to draw
this inference from a defendant's refusal to answer. 8 WIGMORg, EVIDENC., § 2272,
nn. 2-11 (3d ed. 1940).
22. See 2 WIGMORn, EVIDENCS §§ 579-580 (3d ed. 1940) wherein it is made
clear that only a party of record formally charged was an incompetent witness at
common law; hence only these people were made competent witnesses under the
statutes. Parties not formally charged have, thus, always been considered competent
witnesses.
23. U. S. CoNST. amend. V; N. Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Both constitutions recognize both the element of compulsion and the fact that the testimony must incriminate
the person testifying. Certainly the privilege and the violation thereof would be
absurd unless both elements were present.
24. People v. Gillete, 126 App. Div. 665. 111 N.Y.S. 133 (1908) ; People v.
Bermel, 71 Misc. Rep. 356, 128 N.Y.S. 524 (1911).
25. 18 WIGM"OR, EVIDPNCE § 2282(2). However no court has ever gone so far
as to say this.
26. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 368 (1951) ; United States v. Klien, 247
F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 924 (1958) ; United States v. Scully,
225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955).
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5

subpoenaed or sworn.2 7 If the Court of Appeals of New York had adopted
the federal rule, it would have been unnecessary to strike down the immunity statute as unconstitutional in its application to prospective defendants. Mr. Justice Burke, dissenting in the instant case, pointed out that, in
drafting the exclusive immunity statute, the legislature intended that a witness testifying voluntarily should not be immune since immunity could not be
granted until the privilege is invoked. 28 The fact that the appellant knew
of his privilege and the right to invoke it and still failed to do so is sufficient evidence to establish the fact that he testified voluntarily. 29 A further
reason for re-assessing the test of "status" as the sole basis for the operation of the privilege is the fact that, although the fifth amendment is not
binding upon the states, the state courts would do well to closely examine
the decisions of the federal courts when deciding cases dealing with the
privilege against self-incrimination.3 0
Robert E. Slota

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SUNDAY

LAWS-STATUTE

DECLARED

UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO ORTHODOX
JEWISH PLAINTIFFS.
Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc. v. Gallagher

(D. Mass. 1959).
An action was brought before a three judge federal court' for a
declaration that certain provisions of the Massachusetts "Lord's Day"
statute were unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs, 2 one of whom
was the Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc. located in Springfield, Massachusetts.3 The manager of the market, its owners, and the other plaintiffs were members of the Orthodox Jewish faith which recognizes Saturday as the Sabbath thus compelling total abstinence from business and
27. Even in New York it has been held that the privilege of a prospective defendant is not violated when he is subpoenaed to appear at a coroner's inquest, and
subsequent voluntary testimony is admissible against him. People v. Molineux, 168
N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901); Teachout v. People, 41 N.Y. 7 (1896).
28. People v. Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d 214, 160 N.E.2d 468, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1959).
(dissenting opinion).
29. Ibid.
30. People v. Nowacki, 40 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Erie County Ct. 1943).
1. The jurisdiction of the court is established under: 62 STAT. 930, 931, 968, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1334, 2281, 2284 (1948).
2. Joined as plaintiffs were Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., a corporation operating a kosher supermarket, three customers suing on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, and a rabbi suing on behalf of himself and
other rabbis similarly situated.
3. The Crown Market is the only store of its kind in the area of Springfield,
and apparently it is the only one within twenty-six miles or more.
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work from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday. However, the manager was convicted of violating the statute4 because the market remained
open on Sunday 5 from 8 A.M. to 6 P.M.,6 although it remained closed
on Saturday. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the
conviction and reaffirmed the constitutionality of the statute which required Sunday closing, T but the court in the present action enjoined the
enforcement of the statute against petitioners and held, with one judge
dissenting, that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs, 8
since it constituted an establishment of religion and a denial of free exercise of religion. 9 Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc. v. Gallagher, 176 F. Supp. 466 (D. Mass. 1959).10
Criminal statutes in forty-seven states make it a misdemeanor to
conduct all but specifically excepted business and labor on Sunday." Although the Supreme Court of the United States has on two occasions held
that Sunday statutes neither violate the commerce clause 12 nor the state's
police power,"s the present case is only the second instance where a federal court has been presented with the contention that such a statute is
an infringement upon the guarantee of freedom of religion contained in
the first amendment. In the earlier case, Friedmanv. New York, 14 in which
it was contended that the state's Sunday statute was an infringement
upon the religious freedom of two Orthodox Jewish retailers who were
convicted of selling uncooked meat on Sunday even though they had
closed on Saturday as required by their religious beliefs, the Court dismissed the appeal from the New York Court of Appeals decision"5 for
4. The statute provides: "Whoever on the Lord's day keeps open his shop, ware-

house or workhouse, or does any manner of labor, business or work, except works

of necessity and charity, shall be punished by a fine of not more than fifty dollars."
MASS. G N. LAWS ch. 136, § 5.
5. The term "Lord's day" has been construed as meaning Sunday.
6. The statute did permit the sale of kosher meat from 6 A.M. to 10 A.M.,
but the court did not view this provision as being practical as applied to the Crown
Market, since all types of kosher products were sold and one-third of the gross
sales were made on Sunday.
7. See Commonwealth v. Chernock, 336 Mass. 384, 145 N.E.2d 920 (1957).
8. The scope of this decision is difficult to understand especially in the light
of the court's language: ". . the discrimination apparent on the face of the statute
constitutes a denial of the equal protection of the laws ..... " This language would
indicate that the statute is unconstitutional and not to be limited in its application
to individual plaintiffs.
9. The court also held that the statute deprived the corporate plaintiff of its
property and the other plaintiffs of their liberty arbitrarily and therefore was a
denial of due process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment; and that the
statute denied the corporate plaintiff the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment.
10. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc. v. Gallagher, 176 F. Supp.
466 (D.Mass. 1959).
11. Czarra, Sunday Statutes in a Modern Community, 61 YALE L.J. 247 (1952).
12. Henington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (1896).
13. Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164 (1900).
14. Friedman v. New York, appeal dismissed, 341 U.S. 907 (1951).
15. People v. Friedman, 302 N.Y. 75, 96 N.E.2d 184 (1950).
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lack of a substantial federal question, thus in effect making it the law
of the land."6 Shortly before the Court was called upon to examine the
validity of compulsory Sunday observance laws, it vitalized the establishment clause of the first amendment in McCollum v. Board of Educ.17 when
it held invalid a statute the effect of which was to aid religious groups
by permitting the use of the public school system and facilities for religious instruction. Only one case has been found in which Sunday laws
were held to be an unconstitutional infringement on the right of freedom
of religion,' 8 and this was subsequently repudiated.' 9 Although historically
Sunday statutes were enacted from a religious rather than a civic standpoint2 0 many courts have justified these laws as valid regulations of
health and morals.2 ' However, the Supreme Court of Florida has declared
that these statutes which exempt many businesses and vocations from
closing bear no such relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare as to be a valid general law. 22 Therefore, in at least one
state these statutes cannot be justified by merely assigning a non-religious
purpose to them.
The decision in the instant case brings Sunday laws within the limits
of the establishment clause of the first amendment, thus reiterating the
Supreme Court's declaration that a "high and impregnable" wall must
exist between Church and State. 23 This recognition is a natural consequence of that doctrine which forbids federal or state governments to
legislate aid for one religion or all religions, or to force or to influence a
person to attend or remain away from church. 24 These statutes compel
a member of a minority group which observes a day other than Sunday
as a day of rest and worship to refrain from transacting business on two
days of the week, if he is to comply both with the dictates of his religion
and the law; therefore, he is put at a disadvantage in business which, in
effect, is a financial penalty for practicing his religion. The statute in the
present case is constructed so that the inevitable result of its enforcement
will be the fostering and encouraging of the Christian religion, thereby
making it state aid to one religion at the expense of others. A statute
which creates such a situation denies the free exercise of religion as well
as establishes one religion. Unquestionably a periodic day of rest is
16.

PFs1gIMR, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREDOM 241 (1953).
17. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948). The Court
said: "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of religious organizations or groups, and vice versa. In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended
to 'erect a wall of separation between Church and State.'"
18. Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502 (1858).
19. Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 679 (1861).

20. 3

21.
22.
23.
24.

STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES

(1950).

State v. Grabinski, 33 Wash. 603, 206 P.2d 1022 (1949).
Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1952).
See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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important to strengthen the mental, physical and moral fiber of the community; however, the reasonableness of these statutes must be tested by
balancing the interest in free exercise of religion against the police power
interest sought to be advanced and the availability of alternative techniques for accomplishing the same purposes. 25 The availability of acceptable alternatives is evidenced by the Sunday statutes containing exceptions which makes them inapplicable to religious groups whose Sabbath
occurs on a day other than Sunday. 26 Even Sunday statutes containing
exception clauses of this nature seem to be a poor solution, when it is
apparent that the religious objections can be remedied and the same
health and welfare purposes achieved by enacting a statute which provides
for one day's abstention from labor and business but leaves the choice
of the particular day to the individual.
Harry I. Oxman

NEGLIGENCE-DUTY

OF CARE OWED BY OCCUPIER OF LAND TOWARU

TRESPASSER-AFFIRMATIVE

ACTS CAUSING

INJURY

TO KNOWN TRESPASSER.

Lo Casto v. Long Island R.R. (N.Y. 1959)
Plaintiff, a six year old boy, entered defendant railroad's train yard
through an open gateway and climbed upon a ladder on a freight car
of a stopped train. As the train began to move, plaintiff heard one of
defendant's servants shout "get off, get off the train," and saw the man
running toward him. Plaintiff was frightened and fell or slipped off the
ladder and his foot went under a car wheel causing severe injuries, whereupon he and his father brought this action for negligence against the
railroad which resulted in a jury verdict and judgment in their favor.
The appellate division reversed the judgment and dismissed the complaint.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, with two justices
dissenting, and held that the duty owed by the railroad to the trespassing
child was merely to abstain from inflicting intentional, wanton or willful
injuries and held as a matter of law that this duty was not breached.
Lo Casto v. Long Island R.R., 6 N.Y.2d 470, 190 N.Y. S.2d 366 (1959).'
An owner or occupier of land owes no duty of care toward an undiscovered trespasser. 2 Therefore, there is no duty to keep the premises
in a condition which will be safe for trespassers who come thereon without
25. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
26. N.Y. PtN. LAW § 2144.
1. Lo Casto v. Long Island R.R., 6 N.Y.2d 470, 190 N.Y. S.2d 366 (1959).
2. Newman v. Louisville & N. R.R., 212 Ala. 580, 103 So. 856 (1925).
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the knowledge of the landowner. 3 However, at the moment that the
trespasser's presence is actually discovered there exists a duty of care
toward him. 4 It has often been stated that the common law duty of the
landowner requires him merely to refrain from any intentional or wanton
acts which might occasion injury to such trespasser. 5 The harshness of
this rule has been somewhat mitigated by the "active negligence" doctrine
under which there is liability to a trespasser for injuries caused by affirmative acts which endangered him. 6 The liability has been extended to
negligent omissions either by recognizing that a failure to act may be as
careless toward the trespasser as positive conduct 7 or by reasoning that
the omission amounted to wantonness. 8 Some courts pay lip service to
the common law rule of limited duty but apply the usual standard of care
by holding that a failure to use ordinary and reasonable care to a discovered trespasser amounts to wanton negligence.9 The better reasoned
opinions have recognized that whether the landowner owes due care to
a particular individual whose presence is known, cannot be made to depend upon whether that person was a trespasser. 10 Therefore, numerous
states have derogated the common law rule of limited duty and have
held that a trespasser, once discovered, has the same rights as a nontrespasser, thereby obligating the landowner to exercise ordinary care
toward him." In any event, what is negligence or wantonness in a given
case is essentially a question of fact and every case depends upon its own
peculiar facts and circumstances.' 2 Therefore, if upon any construction
which the jury is authorized to put upon the evidence, or if any inference it is authorized to draw from it, a finding of the requisite degree of
negligence may be justified, the question of negligence must be left to the
3. Rowland v. Byrd, 57 Ga. App. 390, 195 S.E. 458 (1938). There is, of course,

an exception made to this rule in many states under the so called 'attractive nuisance' doctrine as established by the landmark case of Sioux City Pac. R.R. v.
Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1874).
4. See Sheehan v. St. Paul & D. Ry., 76 Fed. 201, 205 (7th Cir. 1896) which
stated that the obligation is not pre-existing, but arises at the moment of discovery,
and is negative in its nature, i.e., a duty which is common to human conduct, to make
all reasonable effort to avert injury to others from means which can be controlled.
5. McLaughlin v. Bardsen, 50 Mont. 177, 145 Pac. 954 (1915). Traced to its
source, the rule exempting a landowner from liability to a trespasser injured through
the condition of the premises is found to have originated in an overzealous desire
to safeguard the right of ownership as it was regarded in a system of landed estates,
long since abandoned, under which the law ascribed a peculiar sanctity to rights
therein. Humphrey v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 100 Vt. 414, 418, 139 Ati. 440,
442 (1927).
6. Hill v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 153 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1946).
7. Castonguay v. Acme Knitting Mach. & Needle Co., 83 N.H. 1, 136 Atl. 702
(1927).
8. McLaughlin v. Bardsen, 50 Mont. 177, 145 Pac. 954 (1915).
9. Frederick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 337 Pa. 136, 10 A. 2d 576 (1940).
10. See Herrick v. Wixom, 121 Mich. 384, 81 N.W. 333 (1899).
11. Wimsatts Adm'x v. Louisville & N. R.R., 235 Ky. 405, 31 S.W.2d 729
(1930); Danzer v. Great No. Ry., 188 Minn. 580, 248 N.W. 44 (1933); Dyrcz v.
Missouri Pac. Ry., 238 Mo. 33, 141 S.W. 861 (1911) ; Camey v. Concord St. Ry., 72
N.H. 364, 57 Ati. 218 (1903).
12. McLaughlin v. Bardsen, 50 Mont. 177, 145 Pac. 954 (1915); Sadowski v.
Long Island R.R., 292 N.Y. 448, 55 N.E. 497 (1944).
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jury's and where plaintiff receives a favorable verdict from the jury an appellate court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference
4
which may be drawn from the evidence.'
A landowner is guilty of active negligence if he affirmatively directs
the trespasser to do something dangerous while ordering his egress from
the premises. 15 Thus, where a child of tender years is riding on a freight
train as a trespasser, it is the duty of the railroad company and its employees not to endanger his life or limb by causing him to alight from the
train while it is moving rapidly. 16 Moreover, he may not be subjected
to threatening calls or motions which might cause him to jump or fall
from the moving freight car. 17 It is well established that the landowner
is under a duty to stop forces already in motion in order to protect a
trespasser in a perilous position.18 Therefore, the question of negligence
was properly a question for the jury in the instant case,' 9 because a reasonable jury might have found that the affirmative direction to plaintiff
to perform the dangerous feat of alighting from the moving freight train
or the affirmative conduct which frightened the child or the failure to
stop the train was willful or wanton misconduct. Looking at the evi13. Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1874).

14. Stein v. Palisi, 308 N.Y. 293, 125 N.E.2d 575 (1955).
15. Skladgien v. W. M. Sutherland Bldg. & Const. Co., 101 Conn. 340, 125 Atd.
614 (1924).
16. See Enright v. Pittsburgh Junction R.R., 198 Pa. 166, 47 At. 938 (1901)
expressly overruling Cauley v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry., 98 Pa. 498 (1881).
The Cauley case was in accord with the decision in the instant case. These cases

demonstrate the development of the law in Pennsylvania on the duty of a railroad

toward a child trespasser on a train.
17. Pollack v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 Pa. 631, 60 Atl. 311 (1905). See also
Ansteth v. Buffalo Ry., 145 N.Y. 210, 39 N.E. 708 (1895), where the New York
Court of Appeals refused to grant a new trial to the defendant street railway company after plaintiff had received a favorable jury verdict on facts similar to the
instant case. The Court of Appeals in the instant case distinguished the Ansteth
case on the basis that the employee was closer to the trespasser and made physical
motions to strike him in the Ansteth case whereas in the instant case the employee
was not within physical striking distance. This distinction is invalid. In the Ansteth
case the trespassing boy was twelve years old and had jumped upon the car while
it was moving and intended to jump off while it was moving. It was therefore
necessary to show that he had jumped solely from his attempt to escape violence
rather than his prearranged plan, in order to establish causation and freedom
from contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. The opinion of the lower
court reported in 9 Misc. Rep. 419, 30 N.Y. Supp. 197 (1894) brings this out
clearly. In the instant case the boy was only six years old and had no prearranged
plan to jump off the train while it was moving so that the aforementioned elements
were established without the necessity of proving imminent danger of violence from
the employee.
18. In this regard an analogy may be drawn between the circumstances involved
in the instant case in which a trespasser was discovered in the perilous position of
hanging on to the ladder of a moving train and the factual circumstances involved
in a much larger group of cases where a trespasser is discovered in the perilous
position of being on the track in the path of a train. In the latter group of cases
it has been firmly established that an immediate obligation arises to use all possible
means, consistent with the safety of the train and of passengers thereon, to avoid
injury to the trespasser, and failure to do so renders the railroad liable. Omaha &
R. V. R.R. v. Cook, 42 Neb. 577, 60 N.W. 899 (1894). The trainmen must give
immediate warning and stop the train. Gulf & S. I. R.R. v. Williamson, 162 Miss.
726, 139 So. 601 (1932).
19. Pollack v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 Pa. 631, 60 Atl. 311 (1905).
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dence in the light most favorable to plaintiff it must be assumed that the
jury so found. Nevertheless, the court in the instant case overturned the
jury's decision by ruling as a matter of law that the conduct of the
defendant's employee did not constitute willful or wanton negligence. It
would appear, therefore, that the New York Court of Appeals has higher
regard for the right of a landowner to be free from trespassers, than the
right of a trespasser, even after discovery, to be free from overt acts of
negligence.
Michael D. Battaglini

TAXATION-DEDUCTIONS-SALE
YEARS

Is

NOT

AN

AND LEASE BACK FOR THIRTY

EXCHANGE UNDER

REVENUE

REGULATIONS.

Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner (2d Cir. 1959)
Petitioner corporation conveyed the fee of two parcels of business
property to a vendee for a consideration of $2,300,000, concededly the
fair market value. There was no option to repurchase but the vendees
leased back the same property to the petitioner for thirty years and three
days with an option to renew the lease for another thirty years if the
petitioner lessee should erect new buildings on the property. Petitioner
paid full rental values for the lease and, claiming the transaction was a
sale under section 112 (a)' of the Internal Revenue Code, sought to
deduct from income the difference between the adjusted basis of the
property and the cash received. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction claiming the transaction was an exchange of property for like
kind under section 112 (b)(1)2 and Treasury Regulation 111, section
29.112(b)(1) 3 and thus not cognizable for purposes of a gain or loss
under section 112 (e). 4 The Commissioner assessed a deficiency for
the tax year against the petitioner and the Tax Court affirmed. On
appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that the
transaction here was a sale and not an exchange and thus permitted the
taxpayer to deduct from gross income the loss arising from the transaction. Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1959).5
The courts, in implementing the Congressional taxation plan, are
concerned with the substance of a transaction rather than the mere form
and will disregard the transaction for income tax purposes if it is found
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112 (a), 53 STAT. 37 (now INT. Rev. CODE of 1954,
§ 1002).
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112 (b) (1), 53 STAT. 37 (now INT. Rev. CoDE of
1954, § 1031).
3. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.112 (b)(1)-1 (1939).
4. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112 (e), 53 STAT. 37 (now INT. Rev. CODS of 1954,
§ 351, 371, 1031).
5. Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1959).
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to be a sham. 6 However, a sale of property coupled with a lease back
is not of itself such a transaction as to be considered a sham for tax
purpose.7 Rather, the rationale of the "Clifford doctrine," namely a test
of control,8 is applied by the courts to determine whether there has been
in fact a transfer and whether a loss has been sustained.9 In determining
whether a loss is genuine, the whole transaction must be considered to
ascertain whether the taxpayer has actually changed his economic status
so as to be "poorer" after the sale than before it.' 0 Accordingly, whether
one's economic position is modified by a transaction may turn on a consideration of what aspects of ownership a taxpayer has released by reason
of the alleged sale." It is a question of fact for the courts to ascertain
2
whether the taxpayer has in reality given up control of the property.'
A sale and lease back of property with an option to repurchase at the
expiration of the lease may void the tax benefits of a transaction since
the seller may retain an equity in the property by reason of the closely
circumscribed effect of the alleged sale.' 3 In Harman Coal Corp.,14 the
court denied a deduction for a claim of loss on a sale of a tipple for one
dollar to the railway company and a license to use the track without cost,
the transaction being to the mutual benefit of both parties. Also, in
Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner,'5 a claimed loss on a sale of manufacturing property to a college for less than its market value with a lease
back for ninety-nine years was not allowed as a deduction. The transaction
in the Century case was held to be an exchange and not a sale for tax
purposes within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Act and the Treasury Regulations, defining a lease for thirty years or more in exchange
6. Griffith v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 355 (1939) ; Helvering v. Lazarus & Co.,
308 U.S. 252 (1939). See also Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930) wherein
the Court said: ". . . and we think no distinction can be taken according to the
motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different
tree from that on which they grew."
7. Standard Envelope Mfg. Co., 15 T.C. 41 (1950).
8. Clifford v. Helvering, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) where the court held that the
transferor of property for the benefit of a member of the family may still be taxed
on the income as he had not parted with a sufficient measure of control over the
property.
9. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 15 T.C. 544 (1950).
10. Shoenberg v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 446 (8th Cir. 1935), cert. den. 296 U.S.
586 (1935). The court in this instance disallowed a loss sustained by the taxpayer
where he sold his stock and bought the exact amount of shares on the market. It
was in fact an exchange.
11. In Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d..598 (7th Cir. 1948), the court permitted the deductions of rent as a business expense where the petitioner conveyed
land to a trustee for twenty years for the benefit of his wife but reserved the right
to lease a building thereon. But in Shaffer Terminals, Inc., 16 T.C. 356 (1951),
aff'd, 194 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1952), the court did not allow rental deductions after
a sale of equipment to a partnership formed of the stockholders of the seller corporation and a lease back to the corporation. The transaction was not recognized
for tax purposes as the corporation in effect retained all the indicia of ownership.
12. May Dept. Stores'Co., 16 T.C. 547 (1951).
13. Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939) ; D.M. Haggard, 24 T.C. 1124
(1955), aff'd, 241 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Judson Mills, 11 T.C. 25 (1948).
14. 16 T.C. 787 (1951).
15. 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951).
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for a fee interest as being property of "like kind" and not subject to gain
or loss. But a sale of land by a department store at its market value
to an independent person with a lease back for twenty years at a fair
rental price was held to be a bona fide sale entitling the seller to a deductible loss. 16 Similarly, a loss upon a sale and lease back for twentyfive years with the payment of reasonable rent was held to be deductible. 17
The instant case modifies the thirty years lease provisions of the Treasury
Regulations to provide that whether there is a sale or exchange of property for like kind depends on the circumstances of each fact situation
rather than establishing the regulation as an absolute test in itself.
It was said in the Century case that: "the regulation [referring to
Reg. 111, section 29.112(b)(1)-1], in force for many years, has survived successive reenactments of the internal revenue acts and has thus
acquired the force of law." " This principle has been enunciated frequently by the courts where the Internal Revenue Act is so indefinite
that interpretation would be required in order to effectuate its application. 19 One must not conclude that the instant case overrules the long
standing regulation but rather that the regulation must now be applied
in an equitable manner after due consideration of the circumstances in
each case. In this instance, the transaction was not merely a manner of
making a loan; the incidents of ownership did actually change hands. However, it would appear the court did not give due consideration to the option
to renew the lease at the expiration of the thirty year term. It is submitted then, that this case did not present merely a thirty year lease just
barely within the letter of the regulation but rather an expectation of
a sixty year term exists if the petitioner-lessee builds on the property,
a condition wholly within the power of the lessee. The sale and lease
back agreement has many tax aspects if the transaction is found to be a
sale in substance. Under section 100220 a loss may be deducted from gross
income for the taxable year and under section 1231, a loss may be treated
as such from a sale or exchange of capital assets held more than six months.
However, if the transaction is found to be an exchange for property of a
like kind to be held for productive use in trade or business, the transferor
may amortize the amount of any loss over the terms of a lease running for
more than thirty years. 21 The fair rental value paid under the lease back
22
provisions of a valid transfer may be deducted as a business expense,
and in this way the whole investment may be written off including items
which may not be amortized under tax laws, such as land. However, the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 now permits greater depreciation so that
16. May Dept. Stores Co., 16 T.C. 547 (1951).

17. Standard Envelope Mfg. Co., 15 T.C. 41 (1950).
18. Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir. 1951).
19. See Helvering v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110 (1939); United
States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 288 U.S. 459 (1933).
20. Supra note 1.
21. Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951).

22.

INT.

REv. Coln of 1954, § 162 (a)(3).
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the difference between allowable depreciation and rent charges under a
lease agreement has been lessened. 2 3 Furthermore, charitable institutions,
such as colleges in the Century case above, are no longer able to make
use of their tax exempt status to receive rental income from leases with
24
terms of more than five years as such income is taxed as a business lease.
Thus, the tax status of the sale and lease back transaction may no longer
be quite as attractive to the business man.
John F. McElvenny

TAXATION-DEDUCTIONS-WHETHER TERMITE DAMAGE TO RESIDENCE

Is

DEDUCTIBLE AS A CASUALTY LOSS.

E.G. Kilroe (T.C. 1959)
In 1953 when the taxpayer purchased his house there was an inspection made and some old termite damage was found, but the house
was deemed to be sound. That same year, in December, the taxpayer
contracted with an exterminating company for a termite treatment and
five annual inspections. The house was inspected and treated in January
of 1954 and an inspection was made in January of 1955 and no termites
were found. In February or March of that same year the taxpayer found
loose plaster and the contractor called in to replace the plaster found
that it had been loosened by termite activity. In April of 1955 parts of
certain walls were torn away and fresh termite channels were discovered.
At no time did the taxpayer, who had prior experience with termites, see
any moving termites. Taxpayer's deduction in his 1955 income tax return of $2,042.88, the amount expended by him in repairing the termite
damage, was disallowed by the Commissioner. On appeal, the Tax Court
held, five judges dissenting, that the loss arose from a casualty and was
deductible for the year 1955 under section 165(c) (3) of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code.1 E.G. Kilroe, 32 T.C. No. 127 (Sept. 29, 1959).2
23. INT. Rzv. CODF of 1954, § 172 (d) (4) (a) has broadened the application of
net operating loss deduction to include losses sustained on a sale of business assets
under INT. Rev. CoDE of 1954 § 1231 (a).
24. INT. Rzv. CODZ of 1954 § 514 (b)(3).
of 1954, § 165(c)(3) provides:
"§ 165 Losses
(a) General Rule.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained
during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.

1. INT. Rev. COD

(c) Limitation on Losses of Individuals.-In the case of an individual, the
deduction under subsection (a) shall be limited to(3) Losses of property not connected with a trade or business, if such
losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck or other casualty, or from
theft."
2. E.G. Kilroe, 32 T.C. No. 127 (Sept. 29, 1959).
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Section 165(c) (3) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code has appeared
in substantially the same form in the Internal Revenue Acts since 1916. 3
The wording of past and present provisions permitting a deduction from
income for losses arising "from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty
• .has led the Tax Court's predecessor, the Board of Tax Appeals, 5
and the federal courts6 to apply the rule of ejusdem generis7 in constructing the meaning of "other casualty." Prior to this case neither the Tax
Court nor its predecessor had ever held termite damage to be a casualty
and therefore a deductible loss of non-business property.8 The case of
Martin A. Rosenberg specifically held, as a matter of law, that termite
damage is never a casualty loss since it is never sudden.9 However, this
decision was overruled by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
which held that the termite damage to the Rosenberg residence was a
casualty loss stating that suddenness is a relative concept and when compared to the normal term of total depreciation of a building, the deterioration caused by termites is sudden.10 United States v. Rogers" and Fay v.
Helvering,12 both of which held that termite damage is not a casualty loss
since it is not sudden but gradual, were distinguished on the ground that
in those cases the damage was not discovered until at least nine years
after the houses were purchased or built, whereas the discovery of termite
damage in the Rosenberg home was made only a year after purchase.
Subsequent cases in the district courts have followed the rule of the
Rosenberg case holding that it is a question of fact whether termite damage
14
is a casualty loss for deduction purposes.13 In Buist v. United States
5
and Shopmaker v. United States,' where the time elapsed between the last
inspection and the discovery of damage was less than a year, the deduction
was allowed. The most recent Tax Court case in point, prior to the
3.E.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(e) (3), 53 STAT. 13; Revenue Act of
1938, ch. 289 § 23(e)(3), 52 STAT. 461; Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690 § 23(e)(3),
49 STAT. 1659; Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 23(e) (3), 48 STAT. 689; Revenue
Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 23(e) (3), 47 STAT. 180; Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, §
23(e) (3), 45 STAT. 800; Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 STAT. 26; Revenue Act of
1924, ch. 234, § 214(a) (6), 43 STAT. 270; Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 214(a) (6),
42 STAT. 240; Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 5(a), 39 STAT. 759. Hereinafter
reference to INT. Rev. CODE 164(a) (3) includes reference to the above sections.
4.INT. Rev. CoMe of 1954, § 165(c) (3)
5. Charles J. Fay, 42 B.T.A. 206 (1940), aff'd, 120 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1941).
6.Shearer v. Anderson, 16 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1927).
7. The rule requires that when a word designating a general class is used in
a statute immediately following an enumeration of specific things within the general
class, that word is not to be construed in its widest sense but is to be held as applying only to things of the same type as those specifically mentioned.
8. Leslie C. Dodge, 25 T.C. 1022 (1956) ; Martin A. Rosenberg, 16 T.C. 1360
(1951), rev'd, 198 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1952); Charles J. Fay, 42 B.T.A. 206 (1940),
aff'd, 120 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1941).
9.16 T.C. 1360 (1951), rev'd, 198 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1952).
10. Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1952).
11. 120 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1941), modified on rehearing on another issue, 122
F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1941).
12. 120 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1941).
13. Hale v. Welch, 38 F. Supp. 754 (Mass. 1941).
14. 164 F. Supp. 218 (E.D.S.C. 1958).
15. 119 F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Mo. 1953).
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Kilroe case, disallowed the deduction, but on the ground that there was
no evidence that the damage occurred in a relatively short time.' 6 In
addition to "suddenness" to be "other casualty" under section 165(c) (3)
the loss must also have been unforeseeable and unpreventable,17 and the
result of an intervening force or cause.18 Recently the Internal Revenue
Service stated that it would follow the rule announced in the Rosenberg,
Buist and Shopmaker cases only where the facts are substantially the
same as in those cases.' 9 It should also be noted that there are several
cases other than termite cases in which there was no real suddenness, but
the loss was nevertheless held deductible as a casualty, 20 including the
anomalous cases were drought - caused tree damage was found to be a
21
casualty.
Judge Tietjens succinctly stated in his concurring opinion in this
case: "Unless we are willing to hold that termite damage can never be
a casualty, the result reached here is correct on the facts." 22 The rule
that a loss must be sudden in order to be a deductible casualty loss within
the meaning of section 165(c) (3) of the 1954 Code makes it quite difficult to find termite damage a casualty. 23 That suddenness is considered
a prerequisite results in large part from the holdings that the rule, ejusdem
generis, must be applied in construing the phrase "fire, storm, shipwreck,
or other casualty." 24 Suddenness is the characteristic seized upon by the
courts as common to fire, storm, and shipwreck and, therefore, required
of "other casualty." However, ejusden generis must not be used to override the intent of the legislature in enacting a particular statute.25 The
obvious purpose of section 165(c) (3) is to give tax relief when needed
most, i.e., after an unexpected loss, and when most deserved, i.e., after
an unavoidable loss. The effectuation of this purpose requires abandonment of the suddenness test and adoption of a test requiring the loss to.
be unavoidable and the result of an unforeseeable and, therefore, unexpected intervening cause. More equitable and more predictable decisions should be the result of such a rule, and authority for it can be
found in Crystal Spring Distillery Co. v. Cox. 26 There the court stated
16. Leslie C. Dodge, 25 T.C. 1022 (1956).
17. Feinstein v. United States, 54-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 46303 (E.D. Mo. 1954).

18. Keenan v. Bowers, 91 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.S.C. 1950); Edgar F. Stephens,
6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 805 (1947).
19. Rev. Rul. 59-277, 1959 INT. Rpv. BULL. No. 35, at 8.
20. Harry Johnston Grant, 30 B.T.A. 1028 (1934) (gradual sinking of land
held a casualty) ; Willard T. Burkett, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem., 948 (1951) (house
buckling two years after storm held a casualty).
21. Winters v. United States, 58-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 67470 (N.D. Okla. 1958);
Buttram v. Jones, 87 F. Supp. 322 (W.D. Okla. 1943) (dictum); but see James
M. Kemper, 30 T.C. 546 (1958), aff'd, 269 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1959).
22. E. G. Kilroe, 32 T.C. No. 127 (Sept. 29, 1959).
23. See Fay v. Helvering, 120 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1941); United States v.
Rogers,
120 F.2dv.244
(9th Cir. 1941).
24. Shearer
Anderson,
16 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1927) ; Charles J. Fay, 42 B.T.A.
206 (1940), aff'd, 120 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1941).

25. United States v. Mescall, 215 U.S. 26 (1909).
26. 49 Fed. 555 (6th Cir. 1892).
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that "other casualty" in a similar statute 27 meant "lightning, floods, cyclones, or other uncontrollable force which ordinary foresight and prudence
could not guard against or prevent." 28
Leslie J. Carson, Jr.

TRADE REGULATIONS-SECTION 2(a) CLAYTON ACT AS AMENDED
BY ROBINSON-PATMAN

ACT-TREBLE DAMAGES

FOR GEO-

GRAPHIC PRICE DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN
NON-COMPETING PURCHASERS.

Atlas Bldg. Products Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co. (10th Cir. 1959).
Defendant, a manufacturer and seller of cinder blocks in El Paso,

Texas, where it had a virtual monopoly, sold its products in Las Cruces,
New Mexico, at prices lower than its comparable El Paso sales and
below the prices of its competitors in Las Cruces, by using the higher
prices in El Paso to subsidize the prices in Las Cruces. Plaintiff, a competing manufacturer and seller of cinder blocks in Las Cruces, alleging
injury in its business, brought suit for treble damages under sections
2(a)' and 42 of the Clayton Act, as amended, in the district court of
New Mexico. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the district court and gave judgment for the plaintiff, holding that such
practices constitute price discrimination within the meaning of section
2(a) of the Clayton Act. Atlas Bldg. Products Co. v. Diamond Block
& Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959).3
27. Act of May 27, 1872, ch. 213, 17 Stat. 162, provided for refunds of taxes
on liquor if there was a loss from "fire or other casualty."
28. 49 Fed. at 559 (emphasis added). See also Feinstein v. United States, 54-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 46303, 46304 (E.D. Mo. 1954); Eaton v. Glindeman, 33 Idaho 389,
195 Pac. 90 (1921).
1. "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the
purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce where such commodities
are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the UniteA States, or any territory
thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under
the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce or to injure, destroy, or prqvent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them .... ." Clayton Act § 2(a), as amended, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936),
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (J952). Italicized portion is that added by the Robinson-Patman
amendment to the original § 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730 (1914).
2. "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
.... 38 . STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952).
3. Atlas Bldg. Products Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950
(10th Cir. 1959), petition for cert. filed, 28 U.S.L. WgSK 2107 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1959).
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The first to mention price discrimination directly, the Clayton Act
was enacted to strengthen the Sherman Act, 4 the basic antitrust statute.
Section 2 of the original Clayton Act which was directed principally at
protection of competition among sellers 5 proved inadequate to eliminate
discriminatory practices affecting competition among buyers. Consequently,
the Robinson-Patman Act was enacted to restore a competitive balance.
Section 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act, which imposes only civil liability,
was included originally in the Robinson-Patman Bill; while section 3,6
which imposes criminal liability was originally the Borah-Van Nuys
Bill. 7 In general, sections 1 and 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act parallel
each other. Section 3 prohibits three kinds of practices: general price
discrimination, geographical price discrimination, and sales of goods at
unreasonable prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor. The first two abuses, general price discrimination and
geographical price discrimination, are also prohibited by section 1 of the
act. There is no mention of the third abuse of selling at unreasonably
low prices to foreclose competitors in the first section of the act. Although
it is clear that section 1 of Robinson-Patman specifically amends section
2 of the Clayton Act and is a part of the antitrust laws, for about twenty
years there was conflict as to whether section 3 of Robinson-Patman was
likewise a part of the antitrust laws and whether a civil action for treble
damages" lies for a violation of its provisions. 9 In the case of Moore v.
Mead's Fine Bread Co.10 the United States Supreme Court allowed an
action for treble damages under both section 2(a) of the amended Clayton
Act and section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act without specifying which
section was the basis for the decision. The question was finally presented
4. 26 STAT. 209-10 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952).
5. H.R. RgP. No. 627, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1914); S. RP. No. 698, 63rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44 (1914).
6. "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, to be a party to, or assist in, any transaction of sale, or contract
to sell, which discriminates to his knowledge against competitors of the purchaser,

in that any discount, rebate allowance, or advertising service charge is granted to
the purchaser over and above any discount, rebate, allowance, or advertising service
charge available at the time of such transaction to said competitors in respect of a
sale of goods of like grade, quality and quantity; to sell, or contract to sell, goods
in any part of the United States; or, sell, or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably
low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.
"Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year,
or both." 49 STAT. 1528, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1952).
7. 80 CONG. Rzc. 941 (1936).
8. Supra note 2.

9. Cases holding private remedies available for violation of § 3 Robinson-Patman

include: Dean Oil Co. v. American Oil Co., 147 F. Supp. 414 (D.C.N.J. 1956);
Spencer v. Sun Oil, 94 F. Supp. 408 (D.C. Conn. 1950); Balian Ice Cream Co.
Inc. v. Arden Farms Co., 94 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal. 1950). Cases holding § 3
Robinson-Patman not an antritrust law and preventing relief include: Mackey v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 237 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1956); National Used Car Market
Report, Inc. v. National Auto Dealers Ass'n., 108 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1951),
aff'd., 200 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
10. Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
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squarely to the Supreme Court in Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co.,"
and it was held that section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act does not amend
the Clayton Act and a private cause of action does not lie for practices forbidden only by this section. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has recently held in the case of Anheuser Busch Co. v.
FTC12 that no cause of action lies under section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act
for injury to competition with a seller by means of geographic price discrimination between non-competing purchasers. The instant case rejects
3
2
this decision and holds that such an action does lie under section (a).1
A careful reading of section 2(a) discloses that it protects competition
at either of two levels: competition with the seller who grants the discrimination, "primary line" competition; or competition with customers of the
seller, "secondary line" competition. 14 The instant case is, of course, an
example of the operation of section 2(a) to protect "primary line" competition. Prior to its amendment by the Robinson-Patman Act, section 2 of the
Clayton Act was held to support an action for an injunction by a "primary

line" competitor for injury due to geographic price discrimination.'" The
principal case under the amended section 2(a) is that of E. B. Miller & Co.
v. FTC1 6 in which the court affirmed the finding by the FTC of a violation of

section

2

(a) where the respondent was charged with cutting the price

of chicory in certain markets where it had competition, while maintaining
a higher price elsewhere. In the Anheuser-Busch case"7 the court, quoting
Congressman Utterback, manager of the conference bill on the floor of
the House during debate on the bill, states as a basis for its decision that

there must be more than a price difference to establish a discrimination.' 8
However, the distinction between a price difference and a discrimination

is not that expressed in Congressman Utterback's definition. The primary
11. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958) ; Safeway Stores
v. Vance, 355 U.S. 389 (1958).
12. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. granted,
80 S. Ct. 151 (1959) (No. 389, 1959 Term).
13. Atlas Bldg. Products Co. v.. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950
(10th Cir. 1959) ; accord, National Util. of Gainesville, Inc., v. General Gas Corp.,
CCH 1959 TRADE RAG. REP. (1959 Trade.Cas.),
69447 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 1959).
14. AuSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 44, 46 (ALl 1953); 1 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND

TRADEMARKS § 28.1 (Supp. 1959) at 117; 65YALE L.J. 34, 68 (1955).
15. Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234
(2d Cir. 1929).
11. E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944); cf., Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
17. Supra note 12 at 681.
18. "In its meaning as simple English, a discrimination is more than a mere
difference. Underlying the meaning of the word is the idea that some relationship
exists between the parties to the discrimination which entitles them to equal treatment, whereby the difference granted to one casts some burden or disadvantage
upon the other. If the two are competing in the resale of the goods concerned,,
that relationship exists. Where, also, the price to one is so low as to involve a
sacrifice of some part of the necessary costs and profit as applied to that business,
it leaves that deficit inevitably to be made up in higher prices to his other customers;
and there, too, a relationship may exist upon which to base the charge of discrimination." 80 CONG. Rec. 9416 (1936).
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meaning of discrimination is a difference or distinction in treatment 9
and it is in this primary sense that the words "discriminate" and "discrimination" are used in section 2(a), not in the secondary sense of unfair
or unjust treatment. This is shown by the fact that section 2(a) contains
its own standard of what differences in price treatment are unfair or unjust. Unequal price treatment is a discrimination in price within the meaning of that section and is unlawful 20 when its effect may be substantially
to: (1) lessen competition, (2) tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce, or (3) injure, destroy or prevent competition with any person
2
who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such treatment. '
Discrimination so defined does not require existence of some relationship
between the parties to the discrimination which entitles them to equal
23
treatment.22 It is submitted that the decision in the Anheuser-Busch case
is founded upon a failure to recognize that section 2(a) protects "primary
ne" competition as well as the more frequently litigated situations involving adverse effects on "secondary line" competition. It seems that
there will be more litigation under section 2(a) concerning the effect of
price discrimination on "primary line" competition now that it has been
finally settled that a civil action for treble damages 24 does not lie under
section 3 of Robinson-Patman 25 and this easier road to relief28 is no longer
open to the civil litigant. The result reached in the instant case would
appear to be desirable and will probably be followed by the courts in
future litigation on this point.
Norman J. Shachoy
19. WEBSTER's Nsw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 745 (2d ed. 1959).
20. This statement holds unless, of course, any of the defenses set forth in
§ 2, such as cost justification or good faith price reduction to meet competition, are
available. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
21. (1) and (2) were part of the original Clayton Act; (3) was added by
Robinson-Patman and was aimed at protection for individual competitors. S. Rep.
No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936).
22. AUSTIN,

PRICE

DISCRIMINATION

AND

RZLATkD

PROBLEMS

UNDER

THE

ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 18, 19 (ALl 1953); cf., E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142
F.2d 511, 518 (6th Cir. 1944).

23. Supra, note 14. Perhaps the result reached in that case can be justified upon
other grounds: the temporary nature of the price reduction; or perhaps the good
faith price reduction to meet competition defense set forth in 2(b) may be available.
42 MARQ. L. Rzv. 119 (1958); 26 GEo' WASH. L. REV. 769 (1958).
24. But see, ATTORNEY GEN. NAT'L COMm. ANTITRUST REP. (1955).

The Com-

mittee appears to be in opposition to the provision for private treble damages suits.
Cf., 50 Nw. U. L. Rv. 342 (1955).
25. Safeway Stores v. Vance, 355 U.S. 389 (1958); Nashville Milk Co. v.
Carnation, 355 U.S. 373 (1958).
26. It appears that in geographic price discrimination cases it is easier to show
a violation of section 3 than section 2(a): merely selling at an unreasonable price
is a violation of section 3 and is broader than the prohibitions of section 2(a) ; also
it is not clear that the defenses of section 2 are available for violations of section 3.
After it was held by the Supreme Court that a good faith price reduction to meet
competition is an absolute defense the private litigant found a greater need to turn

to section 3. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951) ; S. Rap. No.
2010, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. 18 (1958).
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